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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
a Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
a Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
a Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
- 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 9. Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12 October 1981 
Hugh J. Miser 
I IASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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CHAPTER 9. IMPLJ3MENTATION 
Edward S. Quade and Rolfe Tomlinson 
If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had 
been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. 
W. Shakespeare 
... the most important ... results ... come in the form of a vision felt by 
researchers as an outcome of deep, concentrated analysis ... The pro- 
cess of transferring t h s  vision is difficult, lengthy, and delicate. 
There is no assurance that it will grow simpler as our vision comes 
closer to perfection. 
J.M. Gvishiani, World Problems: 
Interrelations and Interdependence, 
IIASA Reports, Vol 3, No 1, 1981. 
Although both Shakespeare and Gvishiani may have taken some poetic 
License, to do what has been decided were best to  do or to bring vision to reality 
is a problem in many decisionmaking contexts, particularly those involving pub- 
Lic policy. Systems analysis is not simply an academic exercise; its goal is to 
help bring about change for the bet ter ,  to see what is done is what was decided. 
Change requires more than the words expressing a decision or policy mandate; 
it requires the expenditure of energy, time, and resources. This change is 
implementation: the process of rearranging patterns of conduct so as to honor 
the prescriptions set forth in a decision. 
When a systems analysis is commissioned, the sponsor usually has a goal in 
mind. He would like to discover a course of action that will accomplish some- 
thing he wants at an acceptable cost, a course of action that he can adopt and 
can convince others with whom he shares authority to adopt. Moreover, he 
hopes the action, i! chosen, can be successfully implemented, namely, that it 
not be so modified by the organization that carries it out, or by rival agencies, 
or constrained by the courts, or repudiated by the public, or resisted by those 
who must change their patterns of behavior, or otherwise frustrated, that it does 
not accomplish what was intended. 
For certain kinds of problems and contexts full implementation is a dream. 
The aim of t h s  chapter is to suggest ways for the analyst to help make it less so. 
Unfortunately, beside pointing out some of the many reasons why implementa- 
tion can go wrong and suggesting a number of rather obvious general precau- 
tions, we have little practical advice to offer. Implementation is currently an 
active topic of concern of systems analysts and others; there are numerous 
papers pointing out where implementation has failed, but many fewer that tell 
what to do during the study before the decision is taken to make failure less 
likely. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The term implementation can have several meanirgs. Bardach (1980) iden- 
tifies four: 
(a) Adoption of a policy recommendation by an authoritative individual or 
institution, as in "The client has endorsed our analysis of airport landing fees 
and will soon promulgate regulations to implement it." This is typically an 
operations researcher's or planner's usage (Huysmans 1970). 
(b) The empir ical  de ta i l s  that reflect, or represent, the  application of a 
policy principle, as in "Effluent taxes are fine in principle, but when it comes to 
implementing them we see that  they are often set  too low." ( I t  should be noted 
that "implementation" in t h s  sense is bound to be somewhat imperfect, for the 
same logical reason that  there is always a slippage between a theoretical con- 
struct  and the operations that are  used to measure it empirically.) 
(c) The operat ing rou t ines  of an organization, or a network of organiza- 
tions, that have been brought into being or have been modified by some policy 
mandate, as in "Over the years we have found it necessary to  shift our imple- 
mentation methods away from a reliance on regular audits to voluntary compli- 
ance and self-reporting." 
(d) The process of rearranging patterns of social conduct so as to honor 
the prescriptions set  forth in some policy mandate, as in "We are implementing 
the new workmen's compensation law just as fast as we can." 
For t h s  Handbook, implementation is the process suggested by statement 
(d). I t  starts  after the decision to adopt a particular course of action is made. 
Implementation ends successfully provided the goals defined by the decision are 
acheved and the financial costs and the delay in reachng t.hese goals are  held 
to a reasonable level. 
Lack of success, however, should not necessarily be charged as a failure 
against the implementing organization . The circumstances under wbch the 
policy was designed to  operate may have changed following the decision, the 
estimated costs in time and money may have been deliberately biased downward 
by the sponsor in order to  secure the  approval of other decisionmakers, or the 
policy design itself may have been defective and ill-conceived. 
The importance of giving thought to implementation has long been recog- 
nized, as well as the analyst's responsibility to do so. Witness Aesop's Fable "The 
Mice in Council:" 
A certain Cat that lived in a large countryhouse was so vigilant and 
active, that the Mice, finding their numbers grievously thnned, held a 
council, with closed doors, to consider what they had best do. Many 
plans had been started and dismissed, when a young Mouse, rising and 
catching the eye of the president, said that he had a proposal to make, 
that he was sure must meet with the approval of all. ' I f , '  said he, 'the 
Cat wore around her neck a bell, every step she took would make it tin- 
kle; then, ever forewarned of her approach, we should have time to 
reach our holes. By this simple means we should live in safety, and 
defy her power.' The speaker resumed his seat with a complacent air, 
and a murmur of applause arose from the audience. An old grey 
Mouse, with a merry twinkle in his eye, now got up, and said that the 
plan of the last speaker was an admirable one; but he feared it had one 
drawback. He had not told them who should put the bell around the 
Cat's neck. 
One reason that, until fairly recently, analysts did not make implementa- 
hon of their proposed solutions a subject of investigation during their study was 
the context in which they worked. Early operational researchers worked for the 
military and were themselves essentially embedded within the implementing 
organization, often vetting their ideas on the staff before they reached the com- 
manders. Early systems analysts worked with military and industrial organiza- 
tions, both of whch have a strong line of authority that can usually insure that 
decisions made at the top will be carried out by the organization below, although 
not always efficiently and without modification. In fact, acceptance by decision- 
makers of analytic methods and results was more the problem at first and 
operational researchers began to equate implementation with adoption and use 
of their work. If the output of analysis imluenced a manager's decision in some 
way, it was then said to have been implemented (Schultz and Slevin 1975, p. 6). 
Later, when systems and policy analysts began to work on the social issues 
associated with h o u s w ,  health, education, welfare, and other public affairs, 
implementation was found to be a much more serious problem. Indeed, so much 
so, that for social application, systems analysis came to be regarded in some 
quarters as a worthless approach that  produced solutions only on paper (Hoos 
1972). 
Analysts then turned their attention to implementation, the so-called "miss- 
ing link" in analysis. Archbald (1970), one of the earlier analysts to  mention 
implementation in the sense used in this chapter, stressed that  it did not follow 
automatically and offered suggestions for handling it: 
... even if the  policy alternative recommended by the analyst is 
accepted by top decisionmakers, the program that comes out of the 
organization may have little resemblance to the alternative originally 
envisaged by the analyst and the top decisionmakers. I am not merely 
saying that  an  alternative when implemented may not produce the 
consequences expected. Rather I am saying that the policy alternative 
actually executed is quite lkely  to  have undergone radical revisions a t  
the hands of (the) operating levels. And since a policy is no better  than 
its implementation, t h s  suggests that  analysts need to pay attention to 
the feasibility of a policy alternative a t  operating levels as well a s  t o  its 
acceptability a t  the top decisionmaking level. 
Indeed, i t  may be argued that in many organizations decisions are  really 
made from the bottom up. The policymakers may suggest, but  i t  is the lower 
echelons who really decide. 
Most early discussions of implementation were retrospective and contained 
more descriptive than prescriptive material. (For instance, Pressman and Wil- 
davsky 1973; other material may be found in Bardach 1977 and 1980, Williams 
and McElmore 1976, Rabinovitz, Pressman and Rein 1976, Bermen 1978, Van 
Meter and Van Horn 1974, and Hargrove 1975). The last two references contain 
major reviews of the literature. Wolf (1978) ties the reasons for the implementa- 
tion shortfalls in public policies to  the predictable inad.equacies of nonrnarket 
organizations such as government itself. 
The major responsibility for managing the implementation process lies wiih 
the decisionmaker, but, as it is the analyst's proposal and design that is being 
implemented, he must share responsibility for any failure of implementation. 
l h s  means the analyst needs to be supported so that he can give explicit atten- 
tion to how particular policy alternatives are to be implemented. 
Consider a study to improve public transportation for a city. Suppose the 
primary alternatives considered are: 
(i) improvement of the current bus and expressway systems; 
(ii) introduction of a streetcar system (surface); 
(iii) introduction of a rapid transit elevated system; 
(iv) introduction of a subway system; 
Additional alternatives are formed by various combinations of the primary alter- 
native s. 
Suppose a decision is made to  introduce a subway to supplement the 
current bus and road system. What are some of the difficulties with implemen- 
tation that may arise? 
For one thmg, the current city transport authority, having handled only 
automobile and bus traffic, will have had no experience with subway construc- 
tion or with the operation of an underground electric railway. Consequently, the 
authority wdl have to be augmented and possibly reorganized. Managers with 
seniority and political connections may have to be passed over. New staff with 
special experi.ence and thus higher salaries will have to be added. The known 
difficulties with organizational decisionmaking will arise (March 1965, March and 
Sirnon 1958, Cyert and March 1963, and Allison 1971). 
For another, the systems study on whch the decision to introduce a subway 
was partially based, while it may have been detailed enough to enable the 
decisionmakers to discriminate among the surface, elevated, and subway 
supplements to the current system, was very likely not detailed enough to 
answer many questions regarding implementation. For instance, for comparison 
purposes, it was probably not necessary to investigate whether the subway sta- 
tion nearest city hall should be on the corner of First and Main or Second and 
Market streets. For implementation purposes this has to be investigated and 
decided; after the decision the merchants a t  one location will profit and the 
losers will protest. Bus routes and schedules will have to be rearranged to con- 
nect with those of the subway; people who lose service will fight to regain it. 
Parking lots will need to be set  up in the vicinity of stations in the suburbs at  
which commuters can leave their cars; some neighborhoods may object to these 
lots; some people will be glad to sell the required land, some of the property 
may have to be acquired through legal proceedings. Thus the transit authority, 
in addition to being concerned with management, financial control, regulations, 
inspection and surveillance during construction, providing permits and clear- 
ances, and relations with other agencies, will be beset with people (i.e., political) 
problems. No potential supplier of any of the necessary services is likely to 
cooperate unless it is to his (or his organization's) interest to do so. Some who 
interact with the program will not be clear where their interests lie; this can add 
to the confusion and delay. 
By examining a number of attempts to implement social policy decisions in 
the United States-policies striving to do such things as creating jobs for the 
hard-core unemployed, building new towns, getting teachers to act in a different 
mode, or protecting the civil liberties of persons alleged to be mentally ill- 
researchers have found such programs to be characterized by underachieve- 
ment of objectives, delay, and excessive financial cost. Bardach (1977) attri- 
butes many of the Mficulties to the domination of the implementation process 
"by many actors all maneuvering with and against each other both for end 
results and for strategic advantages." He terms these maneuvers "games." 
One such maneuver is the attempt to divert resources, especially money, 
which ought to be used to enhance the program's objectives, to other purposes, 
often equally worthy. Another "game" or maneuver is to deflect the goals of the 
effort, for instance, by what Bardach (1980, p. 238) calls "Piling On:" 
If a new program enjoys certain initial successes, it naturally expands 
its political support. It then becomes a target for interests who may 
have only minimal commitment to the program's objectives but  who 
wish to  capitalize on its growing political assets. Such a program is 
vulnerable to Plling On in much the same way that a cash-rich corpora- 
tion is vulnerable to being taken over by another firm through a 
merger or a tender offer to shareholders. By the time the Piling On 
process is over, the original program goal may have become greatly 
submerged and/or the supporting coalition may have collapsed under 
the weight of the new interests. For example, the concept of "affirma- 
tive action" in the United States once meant a comrnitment to  give 
preferential treatment to job applicants from racial minorities when in 
other respects they were "equal" to applicants from non-minority 
backgrounds. Over the course of the last ten or fifteen years, however, 
the concept has come to mean quotas and a deemphasis on the 
"equality-in-other-respects" criterion. Many traditional liberals who 
supported the more restricted "affirmative action" concept have 
become resentful and frightened a t  its maximalist redefinition and, in 
effect, have withdrawn energy and attention even from the initial goals. 
Other maneuvers a t tempt  to negate the effect of a new policy by installing 
non-sympathizers b g h  up in the enforcement agency, or by writing regulations 
and rules that  condone existing practices and lighten the penalty for violations, 
or by settlng a h g h  threshold for violations and then putting the entire burden 
of proof on the implementing agency. Still another maneuver is to resist etforts 
to control behavior administratively by tokenism or procrastination. For others, 
see Bardach (1977). 
It is not only the lower, operating, levels that cause difficulties with imple- 
mentation. The Q h e r ,  policymalung, levels can cause problems. No manager, 
good or bad, will forget that these levels exist or be unaware of their possible 
reactions to a decision that he may make. The same applies to committee 
chairmen and to the members of committees who may be reporting to superiors 
whose objectives are by no means in agreement with those of the committee. Of 
course, if a proposal has been well worked out and its implementation adheres 
completely to plan, the decisionmaker need have no fears-but in real life things 
seldom happen t h s  way. There is always something that does not work accord- 
ing to plan-conditions may not be precisely those predicted, other changes may 
occur to alter how the proposal is put into practice. Almost invariably some 
part of the objective will not be acheved, or achieved in a different way from the 
proposal. Ths  is where the difficulty arises. More often than not those at higher 
levels in the hierarchy are more aware of departures from plan than they are of 
its overall successes. If these shortcomings are in areas in which they have par- 
ticular interests, they are apt to react strongly. Consequently, most managers 
are sensitive to  any departure from plan. They adopt a fail-safe policy. They are 
either looking for sometlung with no risk, or something that avoids certain areas 
of risk. This makes it essential for the systems analyst to have not only a good 
idea of the robustness of his solution but also of the entire "political" situation, 
including all the actors involved, and the pressure falling on the decisionmaker 
from higher levels of control. 
3. THE ANALYST AND IMPLEXENTATION 
There is a story that exists in different forms in many countries about a 
man from the big city who stayed for a few weeks in a small village. He did not 
like the life; he thought the villagers fools, and said so. Near the end of h s  stay 
he decided he ought to visit a friend who lived nearby and he asked a villager 
how to get there. "Oh, you want to go there." said the man, seeing his chance to 
get his own back. "Well, no one but a fool would start from here." 
The story applies to systems analysts considering implementation. Here is 
the analyst, having completed h s  investigation, wondering how to ensure that 
his results are implemented. ''If you want to implement your results," he might 
well be told, "no one but a fool would start thinking about it now." Strange as it 
may seem, there are still foolish systems analysts about. 
Why foolish? In the first place, because to talk about implementation in this 
way indicates a fundamental ignorance of the processes by which change is 
achieved. In the second, because such an action is contrary to the nature of 
systems analysis, and thus betrays an inconsistency that discredits the profes- 
sional standards of the systems analyst. 
Organizational decisionmaking. Implementation must be investigated 
early in the analysis. To understand why t h s  is so, it is necessary to examine 
how decisions are taken in organizations. Descriptions of systems analysis, for 
instance, often make it appear that the problem under consideration, and the 
decisions that must be taken with regard to it, exist in isolation. Ths is not the 
case. One problem facing a decisionmaker is a small part of a time-space con- 
tinuum of problems that he b s  to deal with, and his problems are part of a 
larger continuum of problems faced by h s  organization. The decisions taken 
with regard to his problem create new problems and alfect others: similarly the 
decisions taken with regard to these other problems affect his. Furthermore, 
managers rarely take decisions at  a given time in a dispassionate manner, using 
only the information provided at this time, without reference to other informa- 
ban acquired in the past, even though this other information may be hearsay, 
and discredited by what is available at the tune of decision. 
In any organization there is a gradual development of opinion as to how a 
decision should be structured. Even where t h s  is not so, it is generally true that 
the final form of the information fed to the decisionmaker will have been influ- 
enced by arbitrary decisions taken earlier, often by people outside the apparent 
power structure relating to t h s  decision. The shop stewards, the unions, even 
the rank and file all have their influence. Thus, even a one-time decision to deal 
with a unique situation appears on analysis to be the end point of a systems pro- 
cess. Moreover, it soon appears that the systems analyst is tunself part of this 
process. Indeed, from the start  of the investigation-by the questions he asks, 
the information he collects, and the dialogue in which he engages-he becomes 
part of the decisionmaking system by virtue of his very existence. To be effec- 
tive, he must design his actions to be in tune with the behavior of the system, 
involving, or a t  least informing, others of what he is doing. If he merely makes 
hLs input a t  the time of decisions, he may affect the response of the system, but 
only in minor ways. The consequence is ldsely to be a perturbation in systems 
performance rather than the major improvement sought. 
A further point needs making here. We have said that the systems analyst 
is, whether he likes it or not, part of the decisionmaking process. The implied 
interactions work, however, in both directions. Not only does he affect the 
decisionmaking process from the start  of the investigation, but the system is 
also having its effect on his investigation. It is as much a learning process for 
the systems analyst as for the system; in t h s  way, and only in t h s  way, he is 
able to tune his proposals finely to  the requirements of the system. We shall dis- 
cuss the practical implications later,  but it is important to  emphasize again the 
adaptive nature of good systems analysis. 
The role of the analyst. The program for implementation depends, of 
course, on the type of problem under investigation. Preparation for the imple- 
mentation of a decision by the managers of an industrial organization to  install a 
computer program to expedite its operations can be vastly different from 
preparation for implementing a social program established by a legislature and 
having the force of law. Yet in the long run the successful implementation of 
either decision may depend on the flexibility and robustness of the associated 
program for unplementation in coping with varying circumstances that  cannot 
be predicted in advance and its ability to withstand human error and deliberate 
misuse. 
To illustrate the role of the analyst in implementation, two cases involving 
the use of computers are presented. These illustrations might apply either to 
the public or the private sector. 
I m p r o v e d  m e t h o d s  of c a l c u l a t i o n .  Consider developing a set of computer 
programs to assist in designing transport systems in coal mines conveying 
material from the coal face to the pit bottom. A typical colliery contains a 
number of productive faces from which the coal is transported to the shaft by 
means of conveyor beits. At each junction in the underground roadway system 
the coal is transferred from one conveyor to another and, since it is a converg- 
ing system, a trunk belt may receive coal from a number of faces. The flow of 
coal from each face is variable, the big output being several times the average 
output and there are a number of occasions during the shift when there is no 
coal forthcoming from the face at  all. I t  is essential that no part of the system 
be overloaded, for t h s  causes a belt stoppage, which is transferred backwards 
to the face itself, with the consequence that production is lost. Moreover, if a 
loaded belt stops, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to restart it in the loaded 
condition. I t  is, therefore, essential to uncouple the various parts of the system, 
so bunkers are ictroduced. 
The extractive nature of coal mining means that faces at  a colliery are 
always advancing. Moreover, their average life is about one to two years, so that, 
in effect, the entire conveying system has to be redesigned at relatively fre- 
quent intervals. The problem is to decide on belt capacities, bunker sizes, and 
the control rules for deciding when to load and unload the bunkers. 
From a systems-analysis point of view, this is clearly a simulation problem. 
However, because the problem is common to many collieries and, indeed, reoc- 
curs from time to time at  the same colliery, it was desirable to develop a gen- 
eral method of calculation to be used by planning engineers and work-study staff 
in any situation. I t  was, moreover, the first planned exercise of t h s  kind to be 
undertaken w i t h  the organization concern.ed, so that i t  was essential for the 
system to be seen as effective and easy to use. A serious mistake in the early 
stages of its introduction could easily mean the failure of the whole project. 
The first stage of the analysis was, therefore, to tackle the local desgn 
problem at two collieries. This meant developing computer programs for the 
local situation while observing the difficulties occurring in the process. The 
results of the work and how the method might be extended were also discussed 
in detail with the people concerned. These preparatory studies had two impor- 
tant  consequences. In the first, place, they made it possible to identify the 
major technical problems that  would be involved in preparing a universal simu- 
lation program. Secondly, the successful use of the techniques reached the 
management teams, who were enthusiastic about the results and were able to 
talk to their professional colleagues about their potential use in a way that  the 
systems analysts never could have. On the basis of the discussions held after 
this first study, the analysts resolved to go ahead and devise a more general pro- 
gram to be used a t  any colliery. 
This work, however, led to a new difficulty. When working a t  a single col- 
liery, the main contacts were the colliery planners, who provided the data on 
which the simulation was based, and who then used the completed computer 
program. When it came t o  developing a more general program, the managers 
responsible for the work were no longer those who would be using it personally. 
Nevertheless, i t  was essential that responsibility for developing the program and 
implementing i t  lie with the management. Accordingly, a joint committee was 
established consisting of three main elements: The chairman of the committee 
was a management representative and he had engineers on the  committee 
whose joint task was to  observe progress and advise on practical problems when 
they arose. The second element consisted of the systems team members, who 
advised on the methods to  be used and undertook to develop the main par t  of 
the program. Finally, the team included staff from the computer service, who 
were to ensure that the proposals made were compatible with the available com- 
puter system and that  the whole was effectively systematized, so that  the pro- 
grams, once developed, would run quickly and economically using relatively 
inexperienced staff. 
T h s  committee followed progress and arranged trials of the program 
Once a program had been developed, it was necessary to tes t  it for basic 
errors and then pass it to the management staff for trainmg. The analysts 
developed a series of. courses, and, over a period of 12 months, some 100 plan- 
ning and work-study engineers were trained in its use. These courses also 
included some of the  operations research personnel who would have to advise on 
the program's use and ensure its effective application in nonstandard situations. 
The important thing to remember with all simulation programs is that the 
mechanics of using them are often easy to explain, but it is not a t  all easy to 
describe how to use them efficiently. In inexperienced hands, simulation can 
prove to be a n  expensive way of undertaking calculations that a re  unnecessary. 
Each person attending a course was able to run one simulation while there.  
However, it was usually found that  some assistance was required back a t  the col- 
liery from whence he came before he was completely a t  home with the tech- 
nique. Therefore, the presence of local operations research personnel who could 
advise him was invaluable. After about a year the systems-analysis team found 
that the technique had been used a t  over 100 collieries, mostly without the need 
for professional advisers. The programs, whch  have, of course, been continually 
improved and modified, have remained in use for many years. 
The importance of this procedure is best illustrated by the fact that,  when a 
major program improvement was developed three or four years la ter  without 
such a careful process of introduction, all the first management users experi- 
enced major difficulties in using it. The rumor quickly spread that  the program 
was unreliable and management staff refused to try it out. A lengthy trial under 
unusually rigid conditions was necessary before confidence began to be 
restored. 
What, then,  are  the main lessons to be learned from t h s  example? 
I t  is essential to have strong management support if a system like this is 
to be widely accepted. 
There must be joint responsibility for development and testing 
Particular care must be paid to train the staff to use the new method of 
calculation. 
There must be an adequate back-up service whle management staff are 
getting used to the techmque, and, indeed, to educate new management staff. 
A n  organizational system. This second kind of computer system is dif- 
ferent from the one considered in the previous section in that ,  once installed, it 
will be mandatory, that  is, it will be part of the routine operation of the organiza- 
tion, and the people concerned with its operation will have no discretion as to 
whether they use it or not. This is equally true whether the new system replaces 
work previously undertaken in some other way or whether it provides some new 
service. It mlght be thought that the implementation problems of such a system 
are relatively easy, being confined to formal approval by the appropriate con- 
troller and the technical problems associated with the developing and debugging 
a computerized system. The reality is far more complex. For a system to 
operate s u c c e s s ~ y ,  the correct data must be fed into it ,  and the outputs must 
be both usable and used. All these call for control. As systems become larger, it 
also becomes more difficult for the people withn them to  have any understand- 
ing of the consequences of their actions, and the need for control increases. 
But even the best control system does not ensure the organizational 
system's effectiveness and use, unless the system is properly matched both to 
the organization as a whole and to the mdividuals who must use it; indeed, these 
persons must both understand and accept it. Thus, for an organizational sys- 
tem, matching and control are the essence of successful implementation. 
Consider the problem of implementing a centralized computer system for 
provisioning (ordering, stockmg, and distributing) spare parts and equipment 
for a large, dispersed engineering organization. 
Whle this is too large a subject to be covered here, two points of organiza- 
tional behavior need to be emphasized: 
There is an innate resistance on the part of many people to undertaking 
work that appears to them to happen without some system, against the per- 
ceived interests of their immediate group (or even that of the organization as a 
whole). 
Once a working procedure has been established, it develops an internal 
stability of its own. Attempts to make small changes often fail, because there is 
a natural tendency to revert to old and previous practices that feel understand- 
able and comfortable. 
The extent to which these factors can be controlled is discussed later, but 
the fact is that control can never overcome the problems that arise from bad 
design or poor installation. There is only one way to overcome the dangers and 
distortions arising in most man/computer systems: to apply the principle of 
"inversion," whch states that a proposed organizational design should be exam- 
ined from the inside out, that is, the designer must explore the consequences of 
his design for the people in the system and analyze how they will react to  the 
new pressures. Unless this is done, the new system will not be matched to the 
organization, and inefficiency and malfunction will result. 
The next four subsections look at  the characteristics of some of the most 
important human elements in the system: 
(a) The operators-those involved with the detailed day-to-day operations 
of the stores. 
(b) The managers-those who deal with complaints and take responsibility 
for the smooth running of the system. 
(c) The maintainers-those who keep the system operational. 
(d) The controllers-those responsible for the system's overall perfor- 
mance. 
(a) The operators 
Human operators are not mere ciphers to be considered equivalent to the 
electronic units in the computer. By the standards of computer elements, they 
may be judged to a degree inferior in performance; they possess specific posi- 
tive characteristics far outweighing so casual an assessment, yet too often 
ignored both in systems design and implementation. More than one badly 
designed system has been saved from collapse because its operators had a 
better understanding of its performance than the designer. Unfortunately, the 
larger and more computerized the system becomes, the more difficult it is for 
operators to have this saving sense of what is happening. 
People have at  least four important characteristics: 
An extraordinary, even though fallible, memory 
An ability to relate cause to effect. 
Flexibility. 
A sense of purpose. 
Not all operators possess all these values-perhaps only a minority-but a 
system that denies their existence will almost certainly run into serious trouble, 
particularly during implementation, for it is these skills that come into play 
then. Indeed, if the systems designer is lucky, he will find that the operators to 
some degree redesign the system for h m .  He may find that he can never get a 
complicated system up to full operating efficiency without their help. 
These human characteristics are also important in routine operation in 
coping with the predictable mishaps that cannot be dealt with a t  the computer 
level. Thus, if the wrong part  number is given in a requisition, the storekeeper 
very often remembers the right one. If the item has been misplaced in the 
store, he may guess where to look for it; if i t  still cannot be found, he may be 
able to identify another item that is like the one required. Efficient design 
demands that these human characteristics be used. 
Implementing a system that denies the operator the opportunity to be 
human is likely to run into difficulties, for it reduces him not just to a cipher, 
but to a hostile and uncooperative element of the system. 
Another important value of the human operator is h s  tendency to take 
short cuts. If it appears to h m  that effort, time, or money can be saved, he is 
likely to try to save it-and, furthermore, without consultation, unless there is 
some countervailing reason. Thus, if items are in short supply in h s  shop, he 
may do some private rationing to ensure that supplies last until the next 
delivery. 
More importantly still, he can report on any sudden changes of conditions, 
and thus bring corrective procedures into action faster than the computer con- 
trol system can. On the other hand, if he has to perform a detaded calculation, 
but thinks he knows the answer from experience, he will give his answer. If he 
has to record information in difficult or dirty conditions, he is very likely to try 
to remember the information and record it later. Information believed to be 
irrelevant is given less attention than facts whose value is apparent. 
These difficulties can be overcome and the advantages exploited if the sys- 
tem is properly matched to the operator's actual characteristics. (Incidentally, 
to allow for the fact that an operation can best be done in different ways by dif- 
ferent people in different places, there is no reason for some flexibility not to be 
allowed sometimes in systems design.) Fadure to appreciate this has led to seri- 
ous systems failures when transferring a general computer system from one 
context to another, from one country to another or one administrative unit to 
another: the principle also sometimes holds, when one person replaces another. 
This matchmg is something that needs to be examined in detail when the imple- 
mentation stage is belng considered, but it also needs to be reviewed continually 
throughout the life of a system. It is as much a problem of implementation as 
design. 
I t  must not, of course, be assumed that the operators are unalterable in 
their abilities or their understandings: they too are capable of adapting, but 
they need training and teaching (the former for acquiring specific skills, the 
latter for developing understanding). How t o  proceed requires careful analysis. 
If there is a mismatch, it must be identified, and then analyzed. Often the best 
people to undertake this analysis are the operators themselves. They do not 
need to know the details of the whole system, whlch they could hardly be 
expected to understand, but they do need to know the consequences of their 
possible actions on the system as well as to be able to comment on the conse- 
quences for themselves. 
Finally, there remains the question of control. Whether from direct 
disobedience, unconscious drift, or changing conditions, operator performance 
will in time become unsatisfactory, and a control system must exist to ensure 
that it continues to meet the objectives of the system. How can such control be 
instituted? What indices can be used to ensure that departures from the 
desired performance are detected? While the answers to such questions must 
be specific to a given system, they are seldom obvious. Thus, a provisioning ser- 
vice has to minimize costs subject to a given level of service. The costs can be 
measured in part, but the level of service is much more difficult to identify. 
Similarly, one can check that all necessary forms have been filled in, but not 
that they have been filled in correctly. Checks on stock levels are expensive to 
carry out, and are undertaken infrequently, and mistakes that may have 
occurred can rarely be traced to their origins. The problem of control may be 
one of management as much as systems design, but it is essential that such 
indices as the system produces be well understood and related to the real con- 
trol problem, not simply to the computer's functioning. 
(b) The managers.  
In this context a manager is one who is responsible to a group of customers 
for a service or function, for which the computer system is intended to provide 
the routine operating element. Thus, his work has a hghly &scretionary ele- 
ment. For example, one of the issues on which he must rule is whether or not to 
make a special order for items in short supply. An analytically designed provi- 
sioning system, of course, has reordering routines applicable when there is an 
established pattern of use. However, what happens with spare-parts ordering 
when a machlne has only been in use for a short time, or when the operating 
divisions place a large new order for some well-established piece of equipment? 
In order to be able to cope with such situations, the manager must have an 
awareness of such special actions as may be necessary when the standard rou- 
tines no longer apply. It is, of course, conceivable in theory for the system to be 
able to cope with all occurrences, but in practice it may not be worthwhile pro- 
gramming rare possibilities into the system. In any case, trouble shooting when 
serious deviations occur provides managers with their most difficult and 
interesting tasks. 
When an emergency occurs, the manager must be able to take action with 
some knowledge of what its consequences may be. Suppose, for instance, that a 
supplier has production problems that greatly increase the lead times on ord- 
ers. What will the effect of this be on the company's stocks? What will the 
consequence of remedial actions be? It is unlikely for the manager to know how 
to handle every eventuality himself, so he must be able to get t h s  knowledge 
promptly. Thus, he must have quick and easy access to people who know and 
who can undertake the appropriate analyses. These people are called the "main- 
tainers." 
It is also important to realize that all systems have to cope occasionally 
with unexpected events, and that robustness and flexibility may be more impor- 
tant than an optimal solution. A system that can cope with a variety of mputs is 
better than one that is highly efficient for a single kind of input. Again, these 
may be thought to be questions of design, but they are critical when it comes to 
implementation. The manager knows only too well the problems he has to cope 
with. If he feels that the system does not help, implementation will be slow. He 
may not be able to explain why, but his reluctance may be justified. 
Although managers have powers of discretion, they are, of course, part of 
the overall system, and thus subject to checks and controls. Because of those 
powers of discretion, however, these controls need to be primarily through 
indices of performance rather than checks on procedure. It is essential for 
these in&ces to be true measures of performance; indices taken in isolation can 
often work to the overall detriment of service. 
(c) The maintainers/instaLLers. 
What, it may be asked, has systems maintenance got to do with unplemen- 
tation? The answer is a good deal, simply because many of the problems that 
occur later in modifying the system are the same as those that occur in imple- 
mentation. The basic questions are therefore those of systems design, and all 
that needs to be said here is that five elements are needed. 
1. Close contact with the systems analysts, managers and operators 
involved in the plan. 
2. A set of diagnostic procedures. 
3. A set of predictive simulations that can forecast the effects of change. 
4. A well documented basic program structured to allow for change 
5. Above all, an implementation plan that is known to all and that  can be 
modified by those responsible for operatmg the system. 
The importance of the first and last of these cannot be overstressed. A 
man/computer system is a living thing that does not behave in detail as it is 
designed, but neither does it behave in detail in the way that those within it say 
it does. The maintamer needs to be able to analyze and interpret what is hap- 
pening; thus, there needs to be a systems analyst, not just a computer program- 
mer. 
(d) The c O ~ L ~ T O L L ~ T  
The controller is centrally involved in implementing a new system. He is 
committed to installing it-probably more strongly than anyone else, because it 
does a job he sees the need for doing; however, he also has to accept responsibil- 
ity for its cost, and, should it come to a bad end, for its failure. He also has the 
task of resolving a host of minor conflicts between h s  staff and the systems 
d e s ~ n e r s .  He has to decide on where flexibility may be allowed and where new 
procedures are enforced in detail. He must discuss departures from the plan, 
and the effect they will have, not only on his staff, but also on his customers. 
Above all, he must satisfy hlmself that he is getting what he wants; and, beyond 
that, whether the specification he agreed to actually meets his needs. 
Ths last point is an important one: who can blame the system's designer 
for doing what was agreed upon, even if the agreement should not have been 
reached in the first place? In truth, there is no excuse-it is the designer's 
responsibility to see that what the customer says he wants is really what he 
needs. It is remarkable how often t h s  point is overlooked when new organiza- 
tional systems are established. In the provisioning case, for example, it is usu- 
ally assumed that the prime purpose is to ensure that the stock ordering, 
storage, and movement activities minimize overall costs. If this is the sole pur- 
pose, the whole thing becomes a mechanical operation, the controller can go 
home, and the computer can take over. He knows, however, that he cannot go 
home. If his organization faces a severe cash shortage, he must reduce stocks 
even if it means that overall costs go up. If he is in conflict with suppliers, or 
must balance certainty of supply against average lead tirne, or if he is negotiat- 
ing discounts, he must have a system he can control. He must know the conse- 
quences of his actions, and he must be in control. 
The design of a system that enables the controller to cut overall stocks in 
the best way is different from one that assumes overall costs always to be 
minimized; it is no more difficult, just different. It becomes difficult only when 
one tries to use the system for something it was not designed for. Thus, care is 
needed at  the pre-implementation phase. 
The controller's next problem is control. How does he assure himself that 
the system is workmg properly and efficiently? The designer must bear in mind 
that several features of the new system will be new and that the controller will 
not have an instinctive understanding of what values new indices should take. 
(Do not underrate the importance of instinct to a senior manager; it is often the 
reason he has risen in the herarchy.) Most of hrs indicators are internal-costs, 
quantities, staff, etc.-and he has estimates from the systems designer he can 
use for comparisons. However, it is necessary to make two warnings. In the 
first place, almost by definition no system with an external purpose can be 
judged adequately from internal evidence; external indicators must also be 
introduced, and to be effective there must be data so that comparisons can be 
made before and after implementation. Second, it is also necessary to ensure 
that no problems are being pushed to one side in the course of implementation. 
Neglected problems can cause backlogs that lead later to serious deterioration 
in performance. Inhcators that some problem has been overlooked may be ner- 
vous distress in the staff, or steady or increasing overtime. At the implernenta- 
tion phase, no disturbance is too small for study. 
C ~ n c l u d z n g  rernarks.As these two cases make clear, the analyst has a key 
role to play in implementation. His preparation for this role begins a t  the start  
of his work, when he familiarizes himse1.f with the problem situation and the 
actors involved in it, as well as the subtle facts of the setting, including any 
unwritten traditions that may dominate it. For example, if staff reductions are 
permitted only under circumstances of dire distress, the analyst will not be able 
to presume that  a new system will be manned by new personnel chosen for their 
qualifications; rather, he must assume that the existing staff wig accept the sys- 
tem and be trained to use it, and he will have to accept this constraint as he 
develops alternatives. 
Too, the conditions present where the problem exists may also affect how 
any proposed solution will be implemented-and therefore, what sorts of propo- 
sals may be feasible. Giau7ue and Woolsey (1981) tell of the well educated young 
analysts who were 
. . .hired to increase the productivity of a third-world steel mill. A 
major problem lay in the scheduling of three electric arc furnaces. 
The time requlred to process a charge depended upon the amount of 
power fed to the furnace, thus power scheduling was a critical decision 
variable. Furnace operators, who were on an incentive plan, had to 
work withn a power capacity for each furnace, a total capacity for the 
plant, and had to schedule such resources as charging and pouring 
cranes so as not to interfere with one another. 
The [analysts] . . . studied the problem, gathered operating and 
capacity data, and developed a complex model to  handle furnace 
scheduling. A computer system, complete with video displays for each 
furnace operator, was procured, and massive amounts of time and 
money were expended in developing and debugging the code, report 
writers, system interfaces, and so forth. Total cost was appoximately 
2.5 million US dollars. All concerned settled back, confidently expect- 
ing major increases in productivity. 
Unfortunately, productivity didn't change at all. The system 
designers had overlooked one minor detail; of the 24 people who 
operated the furnaces over three shifts, only f i v e  could read!  The 
study team had never bothered to go to  the furnaces, and had never 
studied the  actual operations, much less learned how to do them. 
What was wrong? The [analysts] . . . were undeniably bright; 
technically, the system was fine. What was lachng was a sense of per- 
spective, a knowledge of reality, an  understanding of the business, and 
an understanding of the cultural infrastructure. The furnace produc- 
tion was substantially increased . . . by junking the 2.5 million US dol- 
lar computer system and s u b s t i t u t q  a scheduling method based on 
colored blocks in a plastic frame. Cost . . . was less that 200 US dollars 
for the deluxe model. [Italics in the original.] 
An initial familiarity with the settmg-renewed at  times throughout the 
analysis-is an essential basis, not only for choosing alternatives for analysis, but 
also for implementing the one that 1s found to be preferred. This familiarity also 
is an essential ingredient in a successful mplementation: a carefully drawn plan 
for  it, specifying actors, responsibilities, relations, activities, schedules, and 
desired outcomes. 
No two cases are  ever exactly alke-and the literature of implementation 
does not yield a standard paradigm-but the two cases described extensively 
above suggest many of the elements that must be taken into account in imple- 
mentation plans and activities. 
Similarly, the cases described in Chapter 3 offer some useful insights. 
Although the analysis of blood availability and utilization was sponsored 
by the Greater New York Blood Program, whch serves the needs of 262 hospitals 
and 10 million people, implementation began in the Long Island Blood Services 
area, which contains 34 hospitals and serves two million people. However, an ini- 
tial pilot implementation began by involving a Regional Blood Center (RBC) and 
only four Hospital Blood Banks (HBBS). As Chapter 3 points out: "They were pro- 
vided support to correct rapidly the start-up problems that occurred. Once 
these HBBs were worhng to the satisfaction of their supervisors, they described 
the system to the supervisors of the other HBBs at  seminars where the opera- 
tions research staff, wherever possible, played the passive role of providing 
information when requested to do so. Responding to t h s  approach, all but four 
very small HBBs in Long Island voluntarily joined the program over a two-year 
period, and none have dropped out." 
I t  is important to note in this account that the analysts quickly faded into 
the background (but remained present to help), whle the supervisors who were 
using the system successfdly sold i t  to others. 
It is also important to note that the computer modules supporting the new 
blood-distribution system are run independently, and each allows the relevant 
officials to use their outputs as the basis for making the judgments for which 
they are responsible: 
- The policy selection module "presents the decisionmaker vvlth alterna- 
tive targets (shortage rate, outdate rate, scheduling factor) that can be 
obtained for different levels 01 blood supply in the region." 
- The Istribution-schedule module provides "a detailed schedule of the 
shipments of rotation and retention blood for each blood type that each HBB will 
recive on each delivery day. These schedules are communicated to the I-IBBs for 
comment and feedback. Once this phase is completed, the . . . operation can 
begin." 
- The control procedure allows the RBC manager to keep his operation 
based on up-to-date estimates of the basic parameters of his region's opera- 
tions. 
Further, these modules are designed to make them as transferable as pos- 
sible to other regions-one of the goals of the analysis, and one that  is being 
acheved, not only in the Greater New York Area, but also elsewhere in the 
United States and Europe. 
The fire-protection analysis for Wilmington, Delaware, also developed 
models that  allowed the relevant officials to exercise the judgments appropriate 
to their responsibilities. A mix of these judgments and supporting analytical 
results allowed the analysis team to derive and recommend a new deployment 
that preserved the former fire-protection coverage while achieving some 
economies. Then, the city officials took over the implementation, in this case 
largely a process of negobation and step-by-step decision. 
However, in both t h s  and the  blood-supply analysis the analysts left behind 
a set  of tools and personnel trained to  use them, so that  new problems and 
important changes could be analyzed without aslung for the return of the 
analysis team. 
The analysis dealing with the  problem of protecting the  Oosterschelde 
estuary from flooding was done for a bghly competent t e c h c a l  organization, 
the Netherlands Rijkswaterstaat, as par t  of its own analysis, so implementation 
in the sense of this chapter was hardly a problem. However, it is clear that the 
scorecard method evolved by the analysts contributed to the Rijkwaterstaat's 
ability to present the issues clearly to the Netherlands Cabinet and Parliament, 
who arrived a t  the decision about which option to adopt. 
Since the IIASA global energy analysis loolung 50 years into the future 
could not be done for a world decisionmaker (since such persons do not exist), 
implementation might seem at first glance not to be an issue. However, there 
are hundreds of enterprises and government agencies involved in energy poli- 
cies and operations, and thousands of industrial executives and public officials 
with relevant responsibilities; for all of these this analysis offers useL!  insights, 
and for many it suggests local analyses that can be done against the backdrop of 
the global findings. The IIASA analysis team has helped such organizations and 
people in a variety of ways: by interpreting data, by adapting models, by extend- 
ing analyses, by consultation, and other activities-all of whlch can be thought of 
as implementation. 
The important lessons of all of the examples in t h s  section 9.3 are that 
implementation is as various as the problem settings themselves, that it is an 
important (indeed, essential) extension of the systems analysis activity, and 
that it deserves careful thought, meticulous planning, and energetic effort-all 
guided by considerable diplomacy. 
4. OTHER PROBLEXS 
For certain issues, the alternatives competing for choice by the decision- 
makers may differ in the ease with which they can be implemented. To the 
extent possible, the probability of unsuccessful implementationshould be taken 
into account in the comparison. If alternative A is chosen and it is discovered 
later that implementation cannot be carried out successfully, resources will 
have been expended and possibly other costs generated. Alternative B or some 
~nferior modification of A may then have to be implemented instead. Thus, in a 
cost-benefit analysis, to determine the excess of benefits over costs for the vari- 
ous alternatives, the probability of failure during implementation ought to be 
estimated for each alternative and the expected costs thereby incurred taken in 
account (Peterson and Seo 1972). 
Similarly, before implementation has started, the decisionmaker must 
make sure that the necessary resources, financial and otherwise, are available; 
the analysis, if done properly, will have determined the requirements. 
The wastepaper baskets of the world are full of sound proposals never car- 
ried out because the resources were not available to act on them. It may not be 
the whole resource that is lacking, but only one small, nearly trivial, element of 
the whole. Nevertheless, once the opportunity has been lost, it seldom comes 
again. Accordingly, it is essential for any recommendation arising out of a pro- 
ject drected toward a single decision to be matched to the available resources, 
financial, material, and human. 
The first resource that has to be considered is, of course, money. In most 
organizations, the financial resources are limited either by the amount of cash 
that can be raised or by rules laid down by a higher level of management. Thus, 
the project must be not only attractive in itself but also relatively attractive in 
connection with other proposals that management may be considering. Clearly, 
it is essential for the analyst to be aware of the system in whch financial deci- 
sions are made, what the criteria are, and, if possible, what rival projects may 
be competing. 
Physical resources and other costs must also be considered. A decision 
that to implement requires equipment that cannot be obtained or land that may 
not be available, or gives rise to environmental consequences that may be unac- 
ceptable, will inevitably be rejected, even though it may be hghly desirable 
without these physical limitations. It can never be argued by a systems analyst 
that "such factors are not my concern." 
It can be argued that the importance of financial and physical resources is 
self-evident, that any competent systems analyst wd1 automatically take full 
account of them in the course of his work. Moreover, it is easy to see how this 
can be done, and easy to check that it has been done. However, the problem of 
the human resources is altogether more difficult. Clearly, the human conse- 
quences of the proposals should be included in the systems analysis, just as the 
financial and physical ones, but the problems of doing this are more subtle. The 
proposal may call for more or fewer people working in an installation; it may 
require them to do different work. Some wdl gain in influence and power, others 
lose. Too, the good manager is concerned not only with the direct consequences 
but the secondary consequences. What effect will such a change have on the 
attitudes and efficiencies of those working with h m ?  Is the proposal so against 
their opinions and prejudices that  they will adopt it with reluctance? Will this 
reluctance reduce their efficiency or the quality of the advice he will receive on 
other matters? The good manager is not simply looking a t  t h s  one decision. He 
must have peripheral vision that enables him to sense all the other conse- 
quences. If the advantages to be derived from a proposal that his staff will find 
difficult to accept are very great, he may still decide to go ahead. I f ,  however, 
they are relatively small, he may well decide that the incidental cost to hlm of 
monitoring the implementation outweighs its apparent advantages. Thus, in 
translating proposals into reality, it is essential to make a careful study of the 
manager's human resources. 
5. COPING WITH IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO DECISION 
Matters of good practice. How can the implementation process be struc- 
tured so as to increase the possibility that what is decided will be carried out 
and the objectives attained? Sabatier and Magmanian (1979) contend that these 
five conditions are sufficient to insure successful implementation: 
1. The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in 
target group behavior to the achevement of the desired end-state 
(objective). 
2. The statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambi- 
guous policy and structures the implementation process so as to max- 
imize the likelihood that target groups will perform as desired. 
3. The leaders of the implementing agencies possess substantial 
managerial and political skdl and are committed to  statutory goals. 
4. The program is actively supported by organized constituency 
groups and by a few key legislators ( or by the chef executive) 
throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral 
or supportive. 
5. The relative priority of statutory objectives is not signifi- 
cantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public 
policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that 
undermine the statute's 'technical' theory or political support. 
Ths last condition, of course, can not be known in advance. While the 
analyst can not insure that conditions such as these exist, he can help a great 
deal in bringing about 1 and 2. He does this by formulating clear objectives, by 
suggesting sound alternatives and finding ways to overcome them before plan- 
ning the implementation program. 
First, if the alternatives proposed to the decisionmakers are not directed 
toward clear objectives or are not based on sound analytic principles, the deci- 
sion may be a poor one and not suited to the issue to be resolved. The program 
that is implemented is then not likely to be successful. To quote Bardach again 
(1 980) : 
... the basic social, economic, and political theory behind the policy 
must be reasonable and sophisticated: it will not do, for instance, to 
pretend that most people do not act most of the time in accord with a 
rather restricted notion of their self-interest; nor will it do to ignore 
inconvenient features of the world like the sparse supply of managerial 
and technical competence or the enormous variety of local cir- 
curnstances which policies must serve or the immense difficulty of 
coordinating large-scale activities on the basis of plans and promises 
rather than market signals. 
Second, a basic administrative strategy for implementation should be 
desgned. Such a strategy should be simple, placing as little reliance on bureau- 
cratic processes as possible (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Levine 1972. Kneese 
and Schultz 1975). It should include an estimate of the financial resources 
required by the implementing organization to hire staff, administer the pro- 
gram, monitor the changes, and to carry out any further analysis necessary. 
For each policy alternative-who has to do what? when? how?-must be investi- 
gated. If the implementing organization exists, the analysts need to pay atten- 
tion to the effects of the program to be implemented on the organization itself. 
Such effects  may seem trivial but can have serious consequences. A decision to 
change the pattern of garbage collection in New York City was seriously delayed 
because it disrupted car pools (Beltrami 1977). Sometimes incentives can be 
designed that  will increase cooperation. 
In any event, the analyst should work with his client's staff, involving them 
in the research if possible. This means not merely providmg data and assump- 
tions but questioning forecasts and hypotheses, proposing alternatives, and 
point= out where the difficulties in implementation may lie. 
m r d ,  obviously the analyst must t ry  to anticipate the p'roblems to be faced 
during implementation. To do t h s ,  he may consider the list of program ele- 
ments and their source and support-such things as regulations and guidelines, 
financial accountability mechanisms, goods and services needed, the participa- 
tion by various agencies and bureaus, sources of funds, and so on. Next, he can 
ask: "What can go wrong?" "What can be done about it?" A systematic way to 
approach these questions is through developing a scenario. 
Implementation scenarios. The development of scenarios is one of the 
most useful devices for anticipating the future where uncertainty is large 
(Chapter 4, Brown 1968, Helmer 1966). Preparing a se t  of hypothetical "future 
histories" of a proposed program forces the program designer to think seriously 
about the stresses and strains to wbch h s  proposed program may be subjected 
if implemented. Bardach (1977, pp. 254-255) observes: 
I t  is no easy task for the designer to predict, and following prediction 
to  readjust, the outcomes of such dynamic and complex processes as 
are involved in a loose system of implementation games. In fact,  the 
system is so complicated that it thoroughly defies analysis by means of 
even th.e most complex models known to  any of the social or behavioral 
sciences. It must be approached through what has come to be known 
as "scenario writing." This latter method simply involves an  irnagina- 
tive construction of future sequences of actions-consequent 
conditions-actions-consequent conditions. I t  is inventing a plausible 
story about "what will happen if ..." or, more precisely, inventing several 
such stories. Telling these stories to oneself and one's professional 
peers helps to  illuminate some of the implementation paths that  the 
designer does not want taken. He or she is then in a position to 
redesign some features of the system of implementation games that  
permit him or her and his or her colleagues to tell stories with happier 
endings. Trial and error  through successive iterations produce better  
and better  endings. 
Obviously, scenario writing is an art .  I t  requires imagination and 
intuition. One suspects there is not much that  can be formalized or 
codified about how to do it well. This may be one of the reasons why 
scenario writing is, in fact, not very common even among the most 
experienced policy analysts and designers. 
Bardach (1977, pp. 264-265) offers an outline for writing an  implementation 
scenario. I t  suggests such steps as making an inventory of the program ele- 
ments, paying attention to  who controls them either &rectly or indirectly, and 
statements as to how management will deal with problems of social entropy, 
incompetence for instance. Also i t  asks the scenario writer to show how the pol- 
icy will deal with various dilemmas of administration-tokenism, procrastination, 
massive resistance, diversion of resources, and others. 
For certain problems special analyses directed toward questions of imple- 
mentation may be desirable, for others an  actual experiment may be called for 
before full-scale implementation is attempted. 
Implementation analysis. Many studies can and should be done in two 
stages: a first analysis t o  find out what type of action should be taken or what 
sort of alternative to recommend, and then a second analysis to  specify the 
details of the designated alternative and of the program to implement it. Such 
analyses, leading to the translation of a policy decision into a specific program 
whose objective is to carry out the policy's intent, are termed implementation 
ana1yses.l As an example, consider the hypothetical public transportation study 
mentioned earlier. To evaluate the advantages of a streetcar system over a sub- 
way, the decisionmakers probably need not consider whether the tracks should 
be laid on 1st or on 2nd Street. or whether the cars should have forty or fifty 
seats. But if a streetcar system is to be installed, these decisions will have to be 
made. Again, in the Oosterschelde flood-control study outlined in Chapter 3, 
after the decision was made to choose the flow-through dam with a gate that 
could be closed during a storm, further analysis had to be done to determine 
the most practical width for the gate. 
Sometimes the analysis that takes into account the details of implementa- 
tion can be postponed until after the primary decision; in other cases, it may 
have to be done earlier, at  least in part, in order to set the ranking of the.top 
two or three alternatives. 
Social experiments. Decisions (whether they are the results of analysis or 
not) taken to alleviate social problems are notorious for unsatisfactory conse- 
quences. Implementations have frequently failed to aclueve their objectives, 
often resulting in exorbitant costs and inducing great social disruption. One 
possible way to find out in advance that a program may not work as intended 
and thus avoid wasting resources and political prestige may be to conduct a 
social experiment before starting a full-scale program. 
In practice, a social experiment is an organized attempt to pretest a 
particular innovative policy before committing vast resources to the 
solution of some large social problem. An example might be the exper- 
iment in New Jersey with income maintenance, undertaken before 
there was a national commitment to such a program. In this case, 
alternative programs were tested on sample populations in several 
lThe t e r m  implementation analysis is  also used to  refer to  the study of why authoritative deci- 
sions do not lead t o  expected results (Bermen 1978) or  to  how "specif~c norimarket activities (e.g. 
public policies) can be expected t o  operate, and t o  depart in predictable ways from their costs and 
consequences as originally estimated" (Woli 1878). 
other states (Brewer 1973) 
The housing experiment described in Chapter 1 is another such example. 
For further discussion of the use of social experiments see the chapter on 
experimentation in Volume 2 of this Handbook and Riecken (1974). 
A major advantage of experimentation is that it reveals empirical informa- 
tion about the proposed large program. Clues to the possible activities of those 
who lose or gain from the program are obtained and minor changes that ease 
the path to implementation without compromising the objectives may be 
discovered. 
Social experimentation is not a panacea that guarantees successful imple- 
mentation. There are frequently ethical, methodological, or political reasons 
why experimentation is unwise. Brewer (1973, p. 156) mentions some of these 
ethical issues: 
How are different benefits received by experimental subjects recon- 
ciled and justified? A t  the conclusion of an experiment, how does one 
make restitution for an experimental alternative not finally chosen but 
upon which recipients have become dependent? What about confiden- 
tiality of data and other human problems associated with the conduct 
of the experiment? These and many other primarily e thcal  issues all 
come into play and must be accounted for by the social experimenter. 
Methodological problems are often formidable. It is not easy to deslgn a 
valid experiment. An experiment is not a mere demonstration or a small-scale 
trial implementation of a large program that is under consideration. Such exer- 
cises are often useful but a proper experiment requires a properly selected con- 
trol group and careful analysis of the results. An excellent discussion of the sort 
of implementation problems that  would be likely to arise with a full-scale pro- 
gram, that were not detected in a small-scale demonstration, is provided by 
Davis and Salasin (1978). 
6. COPING WITH IMPLJ3MENTATION AFTER DECISION 
It should be clear that analysis before, or just after, a decision cannot 
insure that the implementation will go smoothly. Circumstances change and the 
unexpected can happen, requiring modification in the program for implementa- 
tion. Analysis is needed both to find satisfactory modifications and to monitor 
and evaluate what takes place. Usually, because the authorities responsible for 
overseemg the implementation program are not those who made the orlginal 
decision, analysts other than those who did the original study are involved. 
Other than through the use of analysis, the decisionmaker or the agent of 
the deciding authority has essentially two approaches to keep implementation 
on the desired path: mediation and persuasion, and intervention using the 
power of the mandate. 
Mediation and persuasion. 
Organizational deve lopment .  Here, a "change agent" enters into a colla- 
borative relationship with the organization and attempts to produce the planned 
change. He attempts to change structure and processes within the organiza- 
tion; decisions are not viewed as being imposed from on high but rather 
decisionmahng is envisaged as a participatory process (K. A. Archibald 1970). 
The organizational developer may be a systems analyst, but different training is 
required. The approach does run the risk, however, of legitimating large distor- 
tions of the policy goals (Bardach 1980, p. 289). The successful strategy, how- 
ever, often depends critically on the special characteristics of the target organi- 
zation. As an example, see R. W. Archbald (1979) on the problems of managing 
change in fire departments, organizations that are characteristically low in com- 
plexity, but u h  in centralization and in formalization. 
Negotiat ions.  The negotiator's goal is to reduce the delays, the misunder- 
standings, and the confusion associated with implementation by communication, 
persuasion, and face-to-face bargaining. The analyst can help by suggesting the 
ways to compromise that do the most to retain the policy goals. The negotiating 
process can create problems as well as solve them, however (Bardach 1977, pp. 
221-244). 
Using the power of the mandate. 
Projec t  m a n a g e m e n t .  Project management has worked well for the U S  
Department of Defense (Polaris) and for NASA to carry out most space missions. 
Project managers are widely used in private industry for keeping a project on 
schedule and costs withn preset limits. One individual controls the implementa- 
tion. Traditionally, he uses systems analysis, computers, PERT, and other 
"modern" management aids. This approach represents a way of overcoming the 
limitations of the usual functional separation of labor (into sales, production, 
and research, for instance) when the organization undertakes a large complex 
project by concentrating power and responsibility in one individual. How well 
project management works for social programs is still a question. 
Pol i t ica l  cont7-ol. A project manager is limited by lack of authority; he is an 
agent, not the originator of the policy mandate or its political trustee. He can- 
not stand against strong political opposition. In contrast, an influential legisla- 
tor or top political appointee can keep a program on track by interesting him- 
self in its progress, playing the role of a " k e r "  (Bardach 1977)-medatq ,  arbi- 
trating, coaxing, bullying, using h s  political clout. Such a fixer cannot work 
alone; he needs a staff, including analysts, to handle the detail work. 
7. CONCLUDING RElY[ARKS 
To select an implementation strategy and to modify it when necessary to 
hold to its objectives are sometimes not considered analytic functions. But all 
the characteristic activities that analysis can assist are there; choices have to 
be made in the face of uncertainty, data has to be turned into information, 
analyzed, and communicated, tasks have to be delegated, and incentives esta- 
blished. Hence systems analysts have a role, not only in preparing for imple- 
mentation, but also in carrying it out, and in evaluating and monitoring the 
results to determine whether the policy is performing as it should. If they are to 
have t h s  last role, however, funds must be provided. 
I f ,  during the course of an analysis, it becomes clear that a program or 
course of action cannot be implemented successfully, then it should never be 
recommended to the decisionmaker for his choice. Ths does not mean it should 
not be investigated, or even that it should not be called to h s  attention. In 
government, it is often clear from the start that the policy that will bring the 
most significant improvement in a given situation is not politically feasible and 
cannot be implemented. Such policies should often be studied nevertheless, for 
otherwise there may be no way for the public to learn the costs of current politi- 
cal constraints. 
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